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Abstract 
Congestion and emissions are two problems in traffic. In general, they have conflict with each other. Tradable credits scheme is 
proved an effective method in Environmental Science. Now more and more scholars introduce it into traffic. Because it possesses 
the advantages that other methods do not have in alleviating congestion and reducing emissions. In this paper we indicate there 
always exists a tradable credits scheme that induces a traffic flow distribution with minimum emissions. We proved a given 
target feasible link flow pattern can be decentralized into user equilibrium by a tradable credits scheme, and sought tradable 
credits schemes for Pareto-efficient control and management of both traffic congestion and emissions on road networks. There 
are two models which could describe the Pareto-efficient problem between alleviating congestion and reducing emissions, i.e., 
bi-level congestion pricing model and weighting problem model. When the emission function is an increasing function, any 
Pareto-efficient flow pattern can be supported as an user equilibrium by the tradable credit scheme. If the emission function is a 
non-monotonic function, we divided the network into two cases: loops-free network and loops network which satisfies Gallager’s 
sense. In a loop-free road network, any feasible link flow pattern can be decentralized into user equilibrium by a tradable scheme. 
In loops network, Pareto-efficient solution may not be decentralized to user equilibrium by tradable credits scheme. However, if 
the loops network doesn’t satisfy Gallager’s sense, any feasible Pareto-efficient link flow pattern can be decentralized into user 
equilibrium by a nonnegative toll scheme/tradable credits scheme. On the contrary, it wouldn’t. 
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1. Introduction 
Traffic congestion and emissions are two global problems we have to face in big cities. Due to congestion, more 
time is wasted on road; Due to emissions, more and more people have to endure severe air pollution. There is a 
closed connection between traffic congestion and emissions. Traffic emissions in congested conditions are 
substantially higher than under conditions of freely traffic flow. However, in general, alleviating congestion conflicts 
with reducing emissions (Nagurney, 2000; Yin and Lawphongpanich, 2006). 
In order to alleviate traffic congestion and control emissions, and achieve the sustainability of transportation, for 
several decades, road pricing has been considered as an effective management instrument. Pigou (1920) firstly 
proposed the idea of road pricing. Similarly, a road user should pay a charge corresponding to both his own 
emissions and the increased emissions brought to other users (Jahansson, 1997). Afterward, immense amounts of 
research on road pricing have been further developed. For recent reviews to congestion pricing, we can see, Yang 
and Huang (2005), Tsekeris and Voss (2009). However, road pricing has its limitations. The most obvious defect is 
unfairness. Wu et al. (2012) used an example in which its network located in Seattle regional by Gini coefficient 
demonstrated the inequity of road pricing. The result showed that none of road pricing policies is progressive 
(benefiting low-income travelers more than high-income ones). 
Given the deficiency about road pricing in alleviating congestion and emissions, tradable credits come up. The 
theory of pollution permit markets was firstly imposed by Coase (1960) on external costs. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) 
identified and recommended the system of emission permits as an economic tool to be implemented. In traffic, 
tradable credits are mainly used for two aspects: emissions and congestion. In transportation pollution, Nagurney 
(2000), Nagurney and Zhang (2001) put apply the emission permit systems to transportation network. Julie (2012) 
dealt with the feasibility of a tradable emission permit system (TEPs) for urban motorists to develop a new 
microeconomic theoretical model which reduces urban pollution. In the part of traffic congestion, it was not until 
2011, Yang and Wang comprehensively explore the system of tradable travel credits in a general network. Now it 
has been extended to heterogeneous users (Wang and Yang et al., 2012), transaction costs (Nie, 2012), income 
effects (Wu et al., 2012), mixed equilibrium behaviors (He et al., 2013), price and flow dynamics (Ye et al., 2013).  
To our knowledge, tradable travel credits system scarcely ever was applied to alleviating traffic congestion and 
emissions simultaneously. In this paper, we get the minimum emissions and decentralize general flow patterns with 
tradable credits. We internalized congestion and emission externalities with tradable credits simultaneous and 
investigated the existence of tradable credits scheme which decentralizes a given Pareto system optimum link flow 
pattern. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Notations and preliminaries are provided in section 2. In section 3, 
we implemented credits charging to achieve minimum emissions. Tradable credits scheme realized internalizing 
congestion and emission externality simultaneous and analyzed the Pareto system optimization with credits in 
section 4. Section 5 presents numerical examples and finally Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Notation and preliminaries 
2.1. The construction of network 
Consider a general network G=(N,A) with a set of N nodes and a set of A directed links. Let av , )( aa vt  and )( aa ve  
be the total link flow, travel time and emissions on link Aa , where )(at is a differentiable, non-negative, strictly 
increasing and convex function. Let W denotes the set of O–D pairs, and wR  the set of all routes between an O–D 
pair Ww . The travel demand for each O–D pair Ww  is denoted by wd , 0!wd . Let wrf ,  denotes the traffic 
flow on route wRr  between an O–D pair Ww . f is a path flow vector ),,( , Wf  wRrf wwr . f:  denotes the 
set of feasible path flow patterns defined by (Meng and Yang, 2002) 
 
 ¿¾
½®¯­  t : ¦

Wwdfff w
wRr
wrwrf ,,0 ,,                                        (1) 
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Let ),( Aavv a   be the link flow vector, and v:  represents the set of feasible link flow defined by (Meng and 
Yang, 2002) 
 
¿¾
½®¯­ :  : ¦ ¦
 Ww wRr
frawrav Aaffvv ,,,, G                                          (2) 
 
Where 1,  raG  if route f  use link a and 0 otherwise.  
Let ^ `Wk  wkw ,  denote a general O–D based credit distribution scheme, where wk  is the amount of credits 
distributed to each traveler over the O–D pair Ww . K  represents the total amount of credits. Then we have the 
equation www dkK ¦  W . ),( Aaa  Nκ  denotes the charge scheme, where aN  is the credit charging for using link 
Aa . <  denotes the feasible set of credit schemes where (Yang and Wang, 2011) 
 ^ `¦ :d: <  vaaAaf vKvthatsuchfK ,),( NN                         (3) 
 
Let p  denotes the unit credit price in the credit market.  
2.2. The equilibrium of network 
Given a feasible scheme with tradable credits, <),( NK , the user equilibrium (UE) conditions can be written 
as(Yang and Wang, 2011): 
 
W! ¦  wRrfifupvt wwrwraaaaAa ,,0,))(( ,,GN                     (4) 
 
W t¦  wRrfifupvt wwrwraaaaAa ,,0,))(( ,,GN                     (5) 
 
The credit market equilibrium conditions are given by (Yang and Wang, 2011): 
 
0, ! ¦  pifKvaaAa N                                                             (6) 
 
0,  d¦  pifKvaaAa N                                                             (7) 
 
3. Emission charging with credits 
3.1. Decentralization of minimum emission flow pattern with credits 
The minimum emission problem is to find the minimum emission flow distribution MEv : 
 
    ¦
: Aa aaavv
vve )(min                                                                       (8) 
 
Now we have the following definition: 
Definition 1.  A tradable credit charge scheme vector, ),( Aaa  NN , is said to decentralize a given minimum 
emissions flow pattern vv : , if it makes v satisfies the following user equilibrium condition in the form of a 
variational inequality (VI): 
 
<:t NNI ,0)())(( vMETME vvvpvt                               (9) 
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Where )(t  is a vector of link travel time, I  is a parameter that transfers money into equivalent time value.  
Theorem 1. If )(ae  is an increasing function for all Aa  and ¦  aaAa ve  is strictly convex, then there exists a 
non-negative tradable credits charge scheme which could decentralize the minimum emission flow pattern. 
Proof. We know that MEav  (the minimum flow on link a ) solves the BUE problem (Yin and Lawphongpanich, 
2006). To obtain a contradiction, assume that MEav  does not solve the problem, let 
'
av  solves the BUE problem 
instead and 'a
ME
a vv z . That is to say, 'aMEa vv d  for all Aa  and 'aMEa vv   for some Aa . Because )( aa ve  is 
increasing, then we have MEa
ME
aaaaa vvevve )()(
'' d  for all Aa  and MEaMEaaaaa vvevve )()( ''   for some Aa . Because 
ME
av  is the minimum emission flow pattern. It is contradictory with our assumption. Thus, the assumption is false 
and MEav  solves the BUE problem.  
3.2. Decentralization of general flow patterns with credits 
For congestion toll, if pure rebate scheme exists, when the rebate scheme satisfies: aa tEW   where 0!E , and 
)( aaa vtt  , the link travel cost ac  becomes 0. So any feasible link flow pattern v can be decentralized into 
equilibrium by a rebate scheme. To tradable credits, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. A given target feasible link flow pattern v  can be decentralized into user equilibrium by a tradable 
credits scheme. 
Similar with Yang and Huang (2004), we have the following proof: 
Proof. Let av , Aa  be the feasible link flow, and )( aaa vtv  , Aa  be the corresponding link travel time. 
Under our aforementioned assumption of increasing convex link cost functions, link flows av  and hence link travel 
time at , Aa , are uniquely given. We now begin to seek a tradable credit scheme to decentralize the given link 
flow as UE. 
Consider the following linear programming (LP) problem: 
 
aaAa vtE¦ min                                                                 (10) 
s.t.   Aavf a
Ww wRr
w
rawr  ¦ ¦  ,,, G                                                       (11) 
        W ¦  wdf wwrwRr ,,                                                                   (12) 
          0, twrf                                                                                           (13) 
 
The dual formulation of the above LP problem is given by 
 
¦¦


Ww
wwa
Aa
a
u
udv OO ,max                                                        (14) 
s.t  Wd ¦¦

wRrtu w
Aa
raa
Ww
w
raaw ,,, GEGO                                   (15) 
 
Where the dual variables, O  and u  are associated with the equality constrains (11) and (12), respectively, and 
aO  and wu  are unrestricted in sign. Let aap ON  . Consider a path wRr  with nonzero flow (i.e. 
W! wRrf wwr ,,0, ). By the primal complementary slackness conditions, for every path r , we have 
 ^ ` W ¦  wRrfupt wwrwwraaaAa ,,0)( ,,GNE                        (16) 
 
Because 0, !wrf , that is to say, 0)( ,   wwraaa upt GNE . This means that the utility of the agents using path r  is 
same for all wRr . By inequality (15), we have 
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Wt¦  wRrupt wwwraaaAa ,,0)( ,GNE                         (17) 
 
Therefore, agents do not have an incentive to switch their paths which achieve user equilibrium, and complete the 
proof.  
4. Decentralization of Pareto-efficient link flow pattern with credits 
From previous statement, we know in general, alleviating congestion conflicts with reducing emissions. Such 
inconsistency naturally leads to a bi-criteria or bi-objective optimization problem for simultaneously minimizing the 
two conflicting objectives. When the emission function’s form is not same, it will produce different results. So we 
divided emission function into two categories, i.e., increasing function and non-monotonic function. 
4.1. ( )a ae v is an increasing function 
Bi-level congestion pricing model is proposed by Yang and Lam (1996). The model can be described as 
following: 
 
¿¾
½®¯­¦
¦


:
aaaAa
aaaAa
vv vve
vvt
)(
)(
min                                                      (18) 
 
This is a typical Pareto-efficient problem which is described as following: 
Definition 2. A link flow pattern vv :* is said to be Pareto-efficient if there does not exist another flow pattern 
vv :  such that )()( *vEvE d , )()( *vTvT  , and at least one of )()( *vEvE   and )()( *vTvT   holds. 
When the emission function is an increasing function, and aaaAa vve )(¦   is strictly convex, any Pareto-efficient 
flow pattern ** vv :  can be supported as an user equilibrium by the tradable credit scheme. (Chen et al., 2011) 
The Pareto-efficient solution can also be obtained by solving the following weighting problem: 
 
))()1()((min aaaaaAa
vv
vvevt DD ¦ :                                     (19) 
 
The marginal cost based tradable credit scheme ( mscmscK N, )of problem(19)can be obtained as: 
 
a
aa
aaa
a
aa
a
msc
a v
vevve
v
vtv w
ww
w )(1)(1)(
*
**
*
*
D
D
D
DN                        (20) 
a
msc
aAa
msc vK N¦                                                               (21) 
 
4.2. ( )a ae v is an non-monotonic function 
Here we want to analyze whether a tradable credits scheme can decentralize the Pareto-efficient solutions of the 
bi-objective optimization problem into user equilibrium when the link emission functions are not monotonically 
increasing. The problem is examined in two types of network topology: loop-free networks and loops networks, 
respectively. The concrete definitions about loop-free networks and loops networks, we can refer Gallager (1977). 
(1) Loop-free networks 
From Hagstrom and Abrams (2010), it has the following theorem: in a loop-free road network, any feasible link 
flow pattern v  can be decentralized into user equilibrium by a nonnegative toll scheme. 
Through above theorem, we can readily conclude the existence of nonnegative tradable credit schemes for 
supporting a Pareto-efficient link flow pattern, based on the result generated by Yang and Wang (2011). They 
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showed that a tradable credit scheme can emulate a congestion pricing scheme in supporting various target link flow 
patterns as an user equilibrium. So we have the following corollary. 
Corollary 2. In a loop-free road network, any feasible link flow pattern v  can be decentralized into user 
equilibrium by a tradable credits scheme. 
(2) loops networks 
If the network contains loops, and the emission function is non-monotonic, Pareto-efficient solution may not be 
decentralized to user equilibrium. About loops networks, we have the following Corollaries and Theorems: 
 If there is no flow on the loop, that is to say the links’ cost is big enough that travelers don’t choose the routes 
which contain the links on the loop. We can “subtract out” the loops on the network, it becomes loop-free network. 
According to Corollary 2, we have Corollary 3. 
Corollary 3. In loops networks, if the flow on the loops is zero, any feasible link flow pattern v  can be 
decentralized to user equilibrium by a nonnegative toll scheme/tradable credits scheme. 
Theorem 3. In loops networks, if and only if loops of flow in the Gallager’s sense do not exist, a feasible link 
flow pattern v  can be decentralized into user equilibrium by a nonnegative toll scheme/ tradable credits scheme. 
Proof. Suppose there exists loops of flow in the Gallager’s sense, and a feasible link flow pattern v  can be 
decentralized into user equilibrium by a nonnegative toll scheme. Let x  be a feasible flow vector, possibly 
containing single-or-multi-commodity loops. Let K  be the maximal set of links used by single-or-multi-commodity 
loops. Now H  is defined to be the set of links k such that 0 kc  for every c which satisfies ],[ cx  is an equilibrium 
and 0tc . Here ac is the cost of link a . It follows from Theorem 2 that K and H are not empty. For each link in K  
contract the link by identifying the head and tail as a single node. The resulting network with same flow between 
origin and destination pairs will not have a multi-commodity loop and hence Theorem 3 applies. Thus there exists a 
strictly positive c  on the contracted network. For each contracted link k , set the cost kc  equal to zero. Because 
every path from an origin to destination has the same length as in the contracted network, we have a cost vector 
c that yields an user equilibrium for the original flow x . Thus for every Kk , this construction gives a positive kc , 
implying Hk . Hence H  is contained in K . Now let Kk as pointed out at the beginning of this section, in an 
equilibrium with nonnegative costs, the cost of traversing any link k contained in a loop must be zero, that is, 0 kc . 
Hence K  is contained in H . We also know kkk tc WE  . Because 0,0,0,0,0    !! kkkkkk ttct EWWEE . 
That is to say, toll schemes in K are negative, and K is contained in H . It is contradicted with our hypothesis, the 
same as tradable credits scheme, which completes the proof. 
5. Numerical examples 
The following loops network satisfies Gallager’s sense. We want to check whether exists the Pareto-efficient 
solution in the network. For simplicity, the emission functions are quadratic form which is used by Sbayti et al. 
(2002) to express the NOx emission factors. There are four O-D pairs: 3ė1, 3ė6, 2ė4 and 2ė5. With O-D 
demands d3ė1=2 and d3ė6=2, d2ė4=2 and d2ė5=2. In the network there exist two loops 2ė5ė3 and 6ė8ė9. 
 
Emission functions: 
2.0)2()( 2111  vve  
1.0)1()( 2222  vve  
1.0)1()( 2333  vve  
2.0)2()( 2444  vve  
1.0)1()( 2555  vve  
1.0)1()( 2666  vve  
2.0)2()( 2777  vve  
1.0)1()( 2888  vve  
1.0)1()( 2999  vve  
2.0)2()( 2101010  vve  
Fig. 1.  A six node-network which has loops 



/LQN
/LQN
/LQN/LQN
/LQN
/LQN
/LQN
/LQN
/LQN
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We can obtain the minimum total emissions link flow pattern, it is listed in the Table 3, and its corresponding 
path flow is listed in Table 4. 
If the link flow is decentralized into user equilibrium, every O-D pairs’ paths’ costs are equal. So, according to 
UE conditions, for O-D pairs 3ė1, 431 ccc  , O-D pairs 3ė6, 5214 cccc  . Combining the two equations 
leads to 352 ccc   , at the same time, aaa tc WE   is for tolling scheme, aaa ptc NIE  is for tradable credits 
scheme. It is equivalent to: 5252 )( WWE  tt  or 335252 )()( NIENNIE ptptt   , that is, 
)( 532532 ttt   EWWW  or )()( 532532 tttp   ENNNI .  We know 0,0,0,0 !!!! atpIE , therefore 
0532  WWW  or 0532  NNN , at least one of 32 ,WW  and 5W or one of 32 ,NN  and 5N must be negative. It shows 
if loops of flow satisfy Gallager’s sense, a feasible link flow pattern v  can’t be decentralized into user equilibrium 
by a nonnegative toll scheme or by tradable credits scheme, but not vice versa. 
 
Table 1. The minimum emission link flow 
Link  MEav  ae  
ME
a
ME
aa vve )( (g/h) 
1 2 0.2 0.4 
2 1 0.1 0.1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Total emissions 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
0.4 
2.2 
 
Table 2. The corresponding path flow of Table 3 
O-D Path Flow 
3ė1 
3ė1 1 
3ė6ė1 1 
3ė6 3ė6 1 
3ė1ė5ė6 1 
2ė4 2ė4 1 
2ė5ė4 1 
2ė5 2ė4 1 
2ė4ė6ė5 1 
6. Conclusion 
We realized the minimum emission and internalized congestion and emission externalities with tradable credits 
simultaneously. At the same time, we investigated the existence of tradable credits scheme which decentralizes a 
given Pareto system optimum link flow pattern. 
With the results established for general feasible flow patterns, we proved that any given Pareto-efficiency system 
optimum link flow pattern can be decentralized into user equilibrium by a tradable credits scheme if the link 
emission functions are increasing. However, if the link emission functions are not increasing, the existence of such 
schemes depends on the topology of the network. If there is a loop-free network, any feasible link flow pattern v can 
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be decentralized into user equilibrium by a tradable credits scheme. If it is a loops network, a Pareto-efficient 
solution may not be realizable as user equilibrium by a tradable credits scheme. 
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